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THE DESIRE OF NATIONS: 
QUÉBÉCOIS ETHNIC SEPARATISM IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE* 
by 
Colin H. WILLIAMS 
Department of Geography & Sociology, 
North Staffordshire Polytechnic, 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper outlines the main characteristics of ethnie separatism as a process. It then analyses 
two théories designed to explain the résurgence of reactive peripheral identity, the Internai Colonial 
thesis and the rôle of the ethnie intelligentsia. Some of the inhérent contradictions in the Parti Québé-
cois's attempt to create a genuine Québécois nation through the promotion of French culture are 
explored as are some of the pitfalls of a référendum on Sovereignty-Association. 
KEY WORDS: Political Geography, separatism, core-periphery relations, cultural division of 
labour, ethnie intelligentsia, Western Europe, Québec. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Colin H. WILLIAMS : Le désir des nations : le séparatisme ethnique québécois dans une opti-
que comparative. 
L'article décrit les principales caractéristiques du séparatisme ethnique en tant que processus. Il 
analyse ensuite deux théories susceptibles d'expliquer la renaissance, en périphérie, d'une identifica-
tion réactive, la thèse du colonialisme interne et le rôle de l'élite ethnique. Il aborde les contradictions 
inhérentes à la politique du Parti Québécois, qui veut créer une nation purement québécoise par la 
promotion de la culture française, et expose les pièges du référendum sur la souveraineté-
association. 
MOTS-CLÉS : Géographie politique, séparatisme, rapports centre-périphérie, division cultu-
relle du travail, élite ethnique, Europe de l'Ouest, Québec. 
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Why Should Norway be independent and not Brittany? Why Ireland and not Scotland? Why 
Nicaragua and not Québec? 
As we ask ourselves thèse questions, it becomes apparent that more than language and 
culture, more than history and geography, even more than force or power, the foundation of the 
nation is will. For there is no power without will! 
Pierre E. Trudeau, 19651. 
Interpreting the will of the nation is a notoriously difficult task, as leaders of the 
international political community are so painfully aware. One interprétation is that the na-
tion is never fully self-aware or developed so long as it remains under the political control 
of another nation. What constitutes benign political control for one génération may turn out 
to be totally intolérable for the next: thus timing is of considérable importance in interpre-
ting the désire of nations. 
Five years ago, many predicted that the strength of Celtic nationalism was such, that 
dévolution, and possibly even independence for Scotland if not for Wales, would be an 
inévitable conséquence of the changing power structure within the United Kimgdom. 
Today, dévolution, not to mention independence, is a low priority in political circles and the 
nationalist parties are embroiled in internai disputes, ideological vacillation and post-
élection dépression. Yet one should not underestimate the power of nationalism, that most 
opportunist, chameleon-like, political theory. Nationalism, by defining the nation as the 
suprême political community, to whom ultimate loyalty is due, invests the nation with tran-
scendent moral sanction and authority. The nation, thus defined, can only fully realize itself 
if it is freed from ail constraints upon its autonomy. Québec is in a far stronger position to 
realize the idéal of independence than either Scotland, Wales or a number of other ethnie 
homelands in Western Europe (figure 1). It has deep-seated, historié ambitions of self-
government nurtured by a distinctive culture and ethnie group identity. It is far richer in 
human and physical resources than the vast majority of actors in the international state 
System. It already possesses most of the institutional apparatus of a sovereign state and 
seems likely to accrue more power to itself in the future. Above ail it has a government 
elected with a clear mandate to renegotiate the terms of her future relationship with the 
rest of Canada. Whatever form that future may take, Québec is surely fortunate to be 
engaged in a political dialogue with members of a political system which are likely to 
honour the desires of her citizens, if it can be demonstrated that the proposed constitutio-
nal changes are the express will of the majority. Events in the rest of the world cast doubts 
on the ability of ethnie minorities to establish independent states in a démocratie fashion. 
My aim in this paper is to look at some récent explanations for the émergence of 
ethnie separatism, and to apply them briefly to Québec. I shall not provide detailed 
commentary on the development of the separatist movement, nor on the programme of 
the Parti Québécois, prefering instead to highlight some of the inconsistencies and ambi-
guities of the explanations offered for the résurgence of politicised ethnie identity2. 
TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC SEPARATISM 
An important analytic distinction exists between 'territorial' and 'ethnie' separatism. 
The former rests its case primarily on the spatial distinctiveness of the potentially indepen-
dent unit. Distance, relative isolation and a perception of unfullfilled resource potential can 
be powerful mobilising influences in the development of a separatist movement, especially 
when allied to a régional distinctiveness which may encompass other variables such as 
language, religion or a common shared history of exploitation3. The history of European 
Imperialism abounds with cases of overseas colonies, whom having seceeded from Me-
Figure 1 
SUBSTATE ETHNIC TERRITORIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
Minor i t y areas 
1 Scots 
2 Welsh 
3 S c o t c h - l r i s h (Protestant); Nor thern- l r i sh(Catho l ic ) 
4 Flemings 
5 Wal loons 
6 Bre tons 
7 Alsat ians 
8 Corsicans 
9 Basques 
10 Catalans 
11 Galicians 
12 Jura Sw iss 
13 South Tyroleans 
14 Sardinians 
15 Sici l ians 
NETHERLÀNDS; 
6 J 
r ) 
WEST 
GERMANY 
FRANCE 
SWITZERLAND^ AUSTRIA 
PORTUGAIS 
ITALY 
SPAIN 
50 CAHIERS DE GÉOGRAPHIE DU QUÉBEC, Vol. 24, no 61, avril 1980 
tropolitan cores, commonly trace a particular epoch in their expérience when the 'mate-
rials' of their uniqueness were moulded by géographie isolation, despite the many appa-
rent similarities in racial origin, culture System and settlement pattern between Métropole 
and colony4. 
'Ethnie' separatism, on the other hand, rests its case on the cultural distinctiveness of 
the community pressing for independence. Frequently, but not necessarily so, they are 
'renewal movements' seeking to recover the cultural identity of a formally independent 
unit5. For nationalist leaders, imbued with the uniqueness of their destiny and contribution 
to the common good of world civilisation, the incorporation of their group into a multi-
national state is inherently contrary to nature and a severe impediment to the full réalisa-
tion of their group development potential. As Smith has demonstrated 
"the watchwords of ethnie separatism are identity, authenticity and diversity... it seeks through 
séparation the restoration of a degraded community to its rightful status and dignity, yet it also 
sees in the status of a separate political existence the goal of that restoration and the social 
embodiment of that dignity"6. 
It follows that for independence to be achieved the primary function is to translate the goal 
of a separate ethnie identity into a political ideology which will animate a movement for 
national freedom7. 
The remarkable feature of many contemporary separatist movements in advanced 
industrial states is that both types of separatism, the territorial and the ethnie, are increa-
singly being combined to produce 'ethno régional movements' which seek to liberate their 
respective peoples firmly settled in distinct, if subservient, territories8. Thus ethnoregiona-
lism, defined as a species of the genus nationalism9, should not be confused with, nor 
measured in the same way as, regionalism10, a term which has long intrigued compétent 
researchers in Political Geography11. 
THE SUBSTANCE OF SEPARATENESS 
We hâve identified 'ethnicity' and 'territory' as the key 'materials' of distinctiveness. We 
may elaborate upon ethnie separatism, the primary concern of this article, as a powerful, if 
somewhat vague, sentiment. It would incorporate descent as a basis of group and of 
individual status, and of spiritual confirmation. We need to know to whom else we belong, 
ethnie separatism can thus provide a 'myth of origins'12. It can also provide a historié 
explanation for the tragic events of past conquest and subordination and a rationale for 
group superiority achieved through suffering, a 'myth of development'13. Underlying this, of 
course, is the question of isolation, of self-sufficiency, of the relative infrequency of sustai-
ned inter-cultural contact giving rise to ethnocentrism, a 'myth of uniqueness'. 
Culture separateness reinforces the sensé of unique descent and destinable history. 
It opérâtes through three salient markers, the meanings of which can vary in différent 
social settings within the ethnie territory. The first are group customs and institutions which 
serve as group boudaries, as modes of exclusion and as sustainers of spécial routines 
and distinctive procédures. A second important variable is language, for not only is it a 
functional means of communication, it is also a préserver of common shared expériences 
and an instrument for cultural division. Often it provides the most tangible barrier to 
assimilation, because of its pervasive influence in societal interaction14. A third 'material' of 
culture distinctiveness is religion, a phenomenon capable both of uniting and dividing po-
pulations at a local and universal scale15. 
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The salience of ethnie résurgence cannot be ignored. It is évident from Table 1 that 
most West European states as well as Canada are experiencing serious ethnoregional 
challenges. We hâve outlined elsewhere the characteristics of ethnie sécession in Western 
Europe16. It was concluded that a number of factors serve to influence the likely trans-
formation of 'régional autonomist' movements into outright 'ethnie régional movements', 
chief of which are the historical circumstances of the minority's incorporation into the now 
dominant centralised state, the tolérance of the state toward politicised ethnie sentiment, 
the industriousness and skill of the mobilising nationalist élite and the international dimen-
sion of ethnonationalism. Let it not be forgotten that the majority of small nation-states 
were created in the aftermath of continental warfare and révolutions, as in the 1840's, 
1920's and 1940's. They were hardly ever purely domestic, administrative and constitutio-
nally devolved territories. More often the résultant new states and their boundaries existed 
despite the daims of nationalist leaders to honour culturally defined borders to avoid 
ethnie conflict. Rather they conformed to the reality of super-power hegemony in Europe. 
Under such circumstances many political leaders faced a paradox in that the boundaries 
of the political unit they were to operate within, did not correspond to the boundaries of the 
ethnie group on whose behalf the claim of independence had been made. Europe has 
since witnessed a succession of cases of nationality formation attempting to make state 
and nation coextensive, a process I suggest which is currently being undertaken in Ca-
nada, both by the fédéral authorities, and more especially, by successive Québécois 
governments culminating in the élection of a party dedicated to the self-government of the 
'Québécois nation', (table 1) 
The materials of separateness hâve to be translated into a self-conscious group iden-
tity before they can become politically useful in the drive for national independence. This 
process, of nationality formation, is one in which objective différences between peoples 
acquire subjective and symbolic significance, are transformed into group consciousness, 
and become the basis of political demands. There are two main stages in the development 
of a politicised nation. In the first stage, the thwarted intelligentsia attaches symbolic value 
to certain objective characteristics, créâtes a myth of group history and destiny, and at-
tempts to communicate that myth to the defined population, especially to the socially mo-
bilising segments. 
Four interactive requisites are essential for the successful transformation of an objec-
tively différent group into a subjectively conscious community: 
namely 1) the existence of a 'pool of symbols' of distinctiveness to draw upon; 
2) an élite willing to sélect, transmit, and standardise thèse symbols for the 
group; 
3) a socially mobilising population to whom the symbols of group identity can be 
transmitted; 
4) the existence of one or more other groups from whom the formative group is 
to be differentiated (figure 2). 
Of central importance is the relationship between rates of social mobilisation and as-
similation of an ethnie group in relation to another, dominant or compétitive group. The 
leading hypothesis hère is that the conditions for the differentiation of a culturally distinct 
ethnie group from a rival group with which it must interact and communicate, occur when 
the rates of social mobilisation within the group move faster than the rates of assimilation 
of that group to the language and culture of its rival. 
Table 1 
Some major separatist movements in the Western World 
Ethnoregional Group Major Ethnonational Linkage(s) Degree of Institutionalisation 
Québécois (6.0 million in Québec, Canada) 
Scot (5.2 million in Scotland, United Kingdom) 
Parti Québécois—Governing party of Québec 
Province since November 1976. 
Scottish Nationalist Party—17.24% of the Soct-
tish vote in May 1979 British gênerai élection. 
High: Successive transfer of power from Ottawa 
to Québec; promise of a référendum on Sover-
eignty-Association in 1980. 
Médium but diminishing; despite narrow major-
ity in Dévolution référendum the promise of 
législative dévolution to an elected Scottish 
Assembly shelved by new Tory government. 
Welsh (2.7 million in Wales, United Kingdom) 
Flemish (5+ million in Flanders and bilingual 
Brussels in the Belgian state) 
Francophone Belgium composed of the Wal-
ioons (3+ million in Wallonia) and the nearly 
one million Bruxellois. 
Plaid Cymru—8A% of Welsh vote in May 1979 
British élections; Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg, 
a mobilised interest group committed to pre-
serving the Welsh culture and language. 
Volksunie—(Flemish People's Party) 11.3% of 
Flemish Belgium's vote in the December 1978 
Belgian gênerai élections. 
Rassemblement Wallon party, with 9.2% of 
Wallonias vote in 1978, and the Front démocra-
tique des francophones bruxellois, with 27.98% 
of Brussels' total vote in 1978. 
Low; outright rejection of Labour's Dévolution 
proposais for an elected Assembly in March 
1979 référendum. 
Extensive institutionalisation in the 'regionalised' 
Belgian state created by the 1970 revision of the 
Belgian constitution, including Cultural Coun-
cils inside the Belgian parliament, advisory 
régional assemblies for Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels-Brabant, and with the 'Accord 
d'Egmont' a step toward a Fédéral System. 
Jura francophones (60.000 citizens of northern-
most part of Switzerland's German-speaking 
canton of Bern) 
Rassemblement Jurassien, System—participa-
tory party now eclipsing earlier protest move-
ments seeking a separate canton for the region's 
francophones. 
By referenda, area separated from Bern 
canton—separate status as the Republic of Jura 
within the Swiss Confédération. 
Ethnoregional Group Major Ethnonational Linkage(s) Degree of Institutionalisation 
South Tyroleans (220.000+ German speaking 
inhabitants in Italy's Alto Adige région) 
Alsacians (approximately 1.3 million inhabitants 
of France's Alsace—Lorraine région). 
Corsicans (150.000 Corsican nationals in a total 
island population of 250.000) 
Bretons (nearly 2.4 million inhabitants in the 
Brittany area of France) 
Northern Ireland's (essentially) Celtic-descend-
ed "Catholics" (35% of the régional population) 
Northern Ireland's (essentially) English-or-
Scottish descended "Protestant" majority (65% 
of the régional population) 
Sud Tiroler Volks Partei—30+% of the vote in 
the Trento-Bolzano région of the 1972 Italian 
gênerai élection. 
Several quasi-political associations with an 
interest group hue seeking to préserve area's 
dialect and language, including the Alsacian 
Party of Progress. 
Action pour la renaissance de la Corse, and 
other smaller action groups seeking régional 
political autonomy for the island. 
Three banned, paramilitary, clandestine organi-
zations, each with a limited following and com-
mitment to régional political autonomy. 
The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican 
Army, a clandestine terrorist organization seek-
ing an end to British rule and "Protestant" domi-
nation, drawing a wider, but spasmodic following 
among the inhabitants than either the officiai 
I.R.A. or its political auxiliaries. 
United Ulster Unionist Council, a party com-
mitted to Loyalist and Protestant cause which 
won 46 of the 78 seats in the régional consti-
tuent assembly elected in June 1975; several 
clandestine Protestant terrorist movements. 
Limited implementation of the 1969 Pakage 
designed to guarantee political and cultural 
autonomy of région; 1971 the création of Auton-
omous Région of Trentino-Alto Adige, subdivid-
ed into German province with some local author-
ity. 
Virtually none; however since the summer vio-
lence of 1975 and 1979 France has instituted 
a re-evaluation of its régional policies vis-à-vis 
its ethnoregional minorities. 
Since 1975 they hâve gained some limited con-
cessions, the right to teach Corsican in schools, m 
a promised reopening of a university, and the i 
appointment of Corsica's first Corsican prefect ï= 
since 1870. co 
m 
Virtually none, as above; however, Giscard g 
d'Estaing's minister of éducation in 1975 an- > 
nounced a programme of state subsidies for the 55 
teaching of Breton. s 
Non-functional. N. Ireland has possessed a 
régional assembly since Ireland's partition; for 
most of the half century before its suspension 
it was dominated by a "Protestant" majority 
insensitive to the needs of the Catholic minority 
and overtly discriminatory. Efforts to re-establish 
civilian government since 1973 hâve focussed 
on a power-sharing committee System scheme 
designed to replace the former cabinet-govern-
ment majority rule system with shared authority; 
so far, efforts to create this system hâve been 
thwarted by the uncompromising opposition of 
the Protestant community's principal linkages 
to the shared power concept. „, 
Ethnoregional Group Major Ethnonational Linkage(s) Degree of Institutionalisation 
Catalonians (8 million in northeastern Spain) Esquerra Democratica and Uige—leftist-and 
rightist-oriented parties seeking régional political 
autonomy. 
Very limited. Some limited cultural autonomy and 
February 1976 verbal récognition by Govern-
ment of the region's unique identity (for first time 
in 40 years) promise of more dévolution to corne. 
Basques (nearly 2 million in the four provinces 
of northern Spain and the three of southwestem 
France) 
Euzkadi Ta Axkatasuna (ETA—"Basque Home-
land and Liberty"); an outlawed, clandestine and 
violent irredentist group seeking a free Basque 
state in a "European Fédération of Races';; 
Enbata, a Basque association of pro-(cultural 
and political) autonomy groups in Basque, 
France, also outlawed. 
Developing: after décades of neglect, and récent 
waves of bomb attacks and political assassina-
tions, the Spanish state is offering a form of 
Home Rule to the Basques and has legaiized 
the use of the Basque language. It remains to 
be seen whether the measures will placate the 
demands of the "poli-milis" who hâve always 
insisted on independence. 
(AsatMay 1979). 
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The second stage in nationality formation involves the articulation and acquisition of 
political rights for the group as a group and not on the basis of individual rights. Political 
demands may be articulated by an élite even before a group acquires cohésion. They may 
even be conceeded in the absence of group cohésion. But the clearest proof of the exis-
tence of a nationality is the achievement and maintenance of group rights through political 
mobilisation. This movement from communal consciousness to political action requires two 
preconditions: 
1) a perception of inequality in the distribution of, and compétition for, the allocation of 
scarce resources and material rewards between groups, and 
2) a political organisation to articulate group demands. 
Government policies may intensify or moderate group conflicts, but the kinds of politi-
cal demands made are likely to dépend more upon calculations relating to the relative 
power of competing élites in a political System than to the adequacy of government poli-
cies in satisfying group demands. The willingness of competing communal élites to share 
political power is of greater importance in maintaining the political cohésion of multi-
national societies than any other factor. Where that willingness is in évidence, communal 
conflicts can be accommodated, where it is absent, separatist demands and overt violence 
and civil war are to be expected. 
In our discussion of nationality formation we should take due cognizance of two ca-
veats. Firstly, it is intended that the objective markers of group identity, such as language 
and religion, are not 'givens' from which national identity naturally springs, they are them-
selves subject to variation and manipulation. Secondly, not ail symbols of group identity 
are of equal value in a functional sensé. Often nationalist élites tend to emphasize one 
symbol above ail others and strive to bring other symbols into congruence with it. Two 
types of structural constraints must be overcome by the nationalist movement to expand 
Figure 2 
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its social base. It must firstly challenge the politically established 'colonial-type' élite who 
controls the means of violence in the territory. Secondly, because of the constraints inhé-
rent in a pre-industrial traditional culture, it must attack the social control of traditional 
institutions and their political rationalisation by alien rule. This leads the nationalist move-
ment into its third, offensive phase, simultaneously challenging the legitimacy of the exer-
cise of power of the state as presently constituted, and the legitimacy of the basic values 
underpinning indigenous traditional social structures. At times this attack on tradition in the 
name of modernisation and industrial development may cause ambivalence as certain 
portions of the native culture must be retained, and even exalted, for the sake of ethnolin-
guistic continuity. 
The fourth and final stage of a successful nationalist movement is to create a new 
consensus in support of the new nation-state. As Guindon observed a décade ago, this 
requires, to varying degrees, "wresting the masses from the symbols of tradition, creating 
and celebrating a new kind of man, a product of the changing society, by initiating and 
controlling the formai and informai means of socialization—the schools, the public mass 
média, etc.—and finally, establishing a considérable degree of bureaucratie control and 
centralization over the whole territory to avoid the fractionalism of tribal (read ethnie) or 
local cultures once the political dominance of the aliens has been removed". 
THE ETHNIC REVIVAL 
A satisfactory understanding of contemporary ethnie separatism nécessitâtes a clear 
formulation of state development and of ethnie group formation. Of the interesting ac-
counts advanced in récent years two are of particular relevance for our comparative re-
view, namely Hechter's work on ethnoregionalism based on the central concept of Internai 
Colonialism18, and Smith's work focussing on state bureaucracy and the ethnie intelligent-
sia^ discontent19. In 'Internai Colonialism' it was argued that ethnie solidarity among any 
objectively-defined set of individuals is due primarily to the existence of a hierarchical 
cultural division of labour which promotes reactive group formation. This cultural division of 
labour is typically found in régions that hâve developed as internai colonies, that is, ethnie 
enclaves of powerful, modemised nation-states. As capitalist exploitation, from the late 
eighteenth century onwards, follows ethnie cleavages and promotes cultural assimilation 
into the core area, industrial expansion must always be to the disadvantage of peripheral 
ethnie collectivities. On realising their condition, the ethnie intelligentsia must advocate 
separatism, if they are ever to avoid the inevitability of économie development as a per-
pétuai dependency of the state core région. Whilst, Hechter argues, most ethnoregional 
movements in Western Europe appear to hâve emerged in such régions, there are notable 
exceptions (among them Scotland, Catalonia and the Spanish Basque country) which ne-
cessitate a reinterpretation of the original thesis. In his more récent work a second, 
segmentai division of labour was identified; this leads to interactive as opposed to reactive 
group formation, being largely determined by the ethnie group itself. 
How do thèse mechanisms explain why spécifie régions are able to maintain their 
ethnie identity despite modernisation and state centralisation20? The crucial distinction 
between an hierarchical and a segmentai division of labour appears to relate to the power 
and vitality of the ethnoregional group's interaction with the international économie order 
and the residual customs and institutions which the peripheral région was allowed to 
maintain after its initial intégration into the developing state. As Hechter explains "the 
hierarchical mechanism contributing to the formation of the ethnie group is the extent to 
which group membership détermines individual life chances. The greater this is, the gréa-
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ter the psychic significance of ethnicity for the individual—and, by extension, for the group 
as a whole"21. Thus in West European peripheral régions, where individuals are not assi-
gned to occupations solely on ascriptive criteria, ethnie identity tends to be strongest 
among those groups at the lower end of the stratification system. 
"The segmentai mechanism contributing to the formation of ethnie solidarity is the extent to 
which members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group. The most critical locus 
of this interaction is the work site, and the best single indicator of it is the degree to which group 
members monopolize certain niches in the occupational structure. Occupational specialization of 
this kind contribute to group solidarity by establishing settings for personal contact that streng-
then ties between individuals with a set of common material interests that serve to reinforce 
informai social ties"22. 
If we translate thèse socio-structural characteristics into régional characteristics we 
find that in 'hierarchical' cases individuals avowing the importance of their culture in peri-
pheral régions (e.g. those with distinctive language or religion such as Wales, Brittany and 
Corsica) are primarily found in the lower ranking positions of the régional class structure. 
In 'segmentai' cases, individuals adhering to the peripheral culture hâve succeeded in 
monopolising key occupations and maintaining a separate set of 'national' institutions. 
Both types of situation structure the respective interaction with the centralising Western 
European state. The former, where the peripheral culture remained beyond, or tangential 
to, the interests of the ruling élite of the state, produces a reactive response; the latter, 
where the peripheral culture was protected by the existence of distinctive régional institu-
tions promûtes interactive group formation. 
An alternative perspective is provided by Anthony Smith who seeks to explain the 
politicisation of ethnie consciousness primarily in terms of the rise of scientific bureau-
cracies and secular éducation24. Modem bureaucracies, uniike previous forms of state 
administration, are not only more complex, more centralised and more interventionist, but 
also more 'scientific', that is they incorporate into their organisations the latest techniques 
and methods of scientific technology. This innovation not only requires a new type of 
personnel as bureaucrat, but also assists the effective pénétration of the state apparatus 
to the farthest part of the state territory. This new kind of bureaucracy demanded a more 
secular, utilitarian and rational perspective and relied more on expérimental and methodi-
cal techniques. 'Rational' éducation began to displace the classical/clerical éducation and 
the sécularisation of society began to undermine the cosmic myths which had formed the 
close traditional bond between State and Church. State modernisation and its pattern of 
uneven development began to erode established agrarian norms and rôles, favouring the 
centre at the expense of the periphery and the educated intelligentsia at the expense of 
the landed classes25. 
"Since the new bureaucracies, often situated in the capitals, tended to command many of the 
avenues to wealth and power, ambitious and qualified professionals clamoured for admission. 
Hence the rise of scientific bureaucracy and critical éducation spurred a whole wave of élite 
mobility, and paved the way for a potentially dissident stratum, and one more dangerous than 
any predecessor on account of their éducation and ability to organise into factions and move-
ments"26. 
Discontent was deepened amongst the ambitious professionals from peripheral areas 
and minority ethnie groups because of the many discriminatory barriers erected against 
them by the impérial and colonial administration which restricted coveted positions to the 
élite of the dominant group27. 
As a second stage, Smith argues that increased state intervention in the présent 
century has produced an aggravated crisis for the thwarted intelligentsia in ex-imperial 
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médium sized states, such as Britain and Spain, because the traditional overseas outlets 
for talented professionals are withering away. The effect, he daims, is worse for the ethnie 
élites of Scotland, Wales or Corsica, because the increased compétition in the domestic 
sector means they can no longer be accommodated, nor their aspirations filled. Struggling 
under their 'double burden' of exclusion and ambition the intelligentsia turn inwards to 
reach a deeper understanding of their own ethnie community. In such a milieu nationalism 
is embraced for it seeks to offer an historical vision of man in society, and because it is 
especially concerned with the formation of identity through autonomy it promises to pro-
vide a respected place for the committed intelligentsia which bureaucracy helped to 
create. Nationalism from this perspective is a meaning—and role-seeking movement28. 
Government policies become the décisive déterminant as to which direction the politi-
cized ethnoregional movement will take. Insensitive bureaucratie policies or benign neglect 
will tend to evoke a separatist challenge, while an accommodating system participatory 
approach will tend to blunt the separatists' grievances and lead to communalist options. 
Ultimately, of course, the success of the separatist movements in the West will be heavily 
influenced by the unfavourable international climate as sub-state dissolution in any one 
medium-sized state might herald the beginning of wider fragmentation within the interna-
tional political system. 
QUÉBEC 
"I know of no national distinctions marking and continuing a more hopeless inferiority... if they 
prêter remaining stationary, the greater part of them must be labourers in the employ of English 
capitalists. In either case it would appear that the great mass of French Canadians are doomed, 
in some measure, to occupy an inferior position, and to be dépendent on the English for 
employment. The evils of poverty and dependence would merely be aggravated in a ten-fold 
degree, by a spirit of jealous and resentful nationality which should separate the working class of 
the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labour..." 
Lord Durham, 1838. 
How did separatism arise amongst this 'jealous and resentful nationality'? Several 
central problems confront us in the application of Hechter's and Smith's discussion of 
ethnie résurgence to the province of Québec. The first main problem is the use of Québec 
as the politico-spatial unit of analysis. As we shall see, nationalist leaders face the long 
established problem of making state and nation coterminous. The basis of Québécois 
separatism is a reinvigorated ethnie consciousness, or 'will' to use Trudeau's terms. But 
rather than undertake the dangerous and politically suicidai task of redrawing Québec's 
boundaries to coïncide with the ethnie majority—the francophone nation—separatist ideo-
logy attempts to convince the non-francophone minorities that the P.Q.'s conception of 
nationalism is territorial and state-based, consequently pluralisme and libéral. The second 
major problem is that no theory, when grounded in the reality of other case examples 
(such as the British example used by Hechter), can do more than point to the complex 
structural conditions which engender separatist movements. One should be wary then of 
asking a particular model to explain too much. The third problem is that aggregate level 
théories often fail to account for the significant, if at times ephemeral, quality of leading 
personalities, the charismatic leadership and myriad interpersonal contacts which contri-
bue to the development of unique political cultures. Finally the interprétation of contempo-
rary history is a notoriously difficult and humbling task, the détails of which we ail too often 
misrepresent in order to be theoretically consistent. 
There is little doubt but that the history of Québec's post-Conquest development re-
veals much in the relations between Québec's English-speaking minority and French-
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speaking majority which supports Hechter's twin éléments of segmentation and hierarchy 
in his cultural division of labour29. By the nineteenth century French-Canadian society was 
essentially rural consisting of a loosely integrated System of expanding parishes30. Within 
this context a set of supra-parochial institutions gave rise to an ethnie élite composed 
primarily of the clergy and seigneurs who, when faced with a surplus population on a 
rapidly diminishing land resource base, needed "structural relief" to maintain their domi-
nance. Guindon argues that structural relief in that milieu, could only consist in industriali-
sation, the very reform the traditional élite could not ensure since it was not, and had not 
been primarily an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and hence lacked the requisite capital31. 
McRoberts has recently demonstrated that during the earlier period of New France 
French-Canadians did in fact possess an entrepreneurial capacity based on the fur trade32. 
Their failure to accumulate capital in post-Conquest Québec was due to major structural 
changes within the Québec economy and to a reorientation of Canada's trade resulting 
from the replacement of France by Britain and the U.S.A. as the main market, thereby 
disadvantaging French-Canadian entrepreneurs many of whom ceased their business 
ventures as a resuit. Whilst successive French-Canadian économie ventures remained 
small and limited, English-Canadian ventures in Québec developed as a resuit of the ex-
panded international market afforded by the Empire and the industrialisation of both Ca-
nada and her Southern neighbour. 
Hierarchical structures developed relatively late in Québec, becoming marked only in 
the early décades of the twentieth century as a conséquence of increased inter-ethnic 
interaction. Large scale rural-urban migrations and industrialisation had created an 
occupational System where French-Canadians were disproportionately concentrated in 
blue collar positions and underrepresented in managerial and technical positions within the 
overwhelmingly Anglophone-owned enterprises. The évidence points to an established 
and widely recognised cultural division of labour. Yet it is a misconception to explain this 
situation as being a direct reflection of the value System of the two contending ethnie 
groups, as some hâve done. The orthodox explanation, until recently, implied a determi-
nistic subordination of French-Canadians, to the more innovative, rational and entre-
preneurial orientated English-Canadian character type33. As a counter-argument, two 
"structural" explanations are offered in the literature34. One concentrâtes on ethnie 
discrimination where English-Canadian owners hâve shown a préférence toward appoin-
ting personnel from within the Anglophone community35. The other stresses the rôle of 
language as a "sorting device" in the allocation of English and French occupations. Given 
the fact that until recently, few in the province were functionally bilingual, Québec Anglo-
phones had a distinct advantage in achieving top managerial positions. It has also been 
shown how the language barrier might stifle not only the performance of French-
Canadians, but also the capacity of Anglophone managers to recognise and promote ta-
lent36. Under such behavioural circumstances language discrimination need not be a 
conscious ploy of an ethnie élite, but an inbuilt structural mechanism reflecting the un-
questioned dominance of English in the Québec business world. Added to the traditional 
linguistic division of labour, there has been an expansion of the provincial govemments' 
responsibilities with those institutions dépendent on the provincial state becoming French 
workplaces while the corporate sector has remained an English workplace. The expansion 
of the provincial public sector gave rise to new bureaucratie élites whose occupational 
promotion was dépendent upon their linguistic compétence. In addition the persistence of 
linguistically-differentiated educational institutions, the development of an aggressive and 
innovative French-language mass média and the expansion of provincially financed social 
welfare services had, by the sixties, created a comprehensive arrangement of French— 
médium institutions. Thus "linguistic and cultural différences hâve persisted not so much 
because they hâve been the criteria of a cultural division of labour, although they clearly 
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have been, but because they are embedded in a whole network of distinctly French-
language institutions which embrace much, if not ail, of the day-to-day worlds of most 
Québec Francophones"37. 
Hechter's cultural division of labour is intimately connected to his inter-regional 
conceptualisation of core-periphery relations. By relating ethnie identity and territorial au-
tonomism to the économie inequality of disadvantaged peripheral régions, the internai co-
lonial theory attempts to link them to a central mechanism of international capitalism, the 
uneven development of régions. We may accept the opération of a cultural division of 
labour in Québec without necessarily accepting Québec as a dépendent periphery, and 
this for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the core-periphery model is essentially a régional 
level type of explanation, it in no way accounts for differential development amongst indi-
viduals. Thus some members of the periphery will undoubtedly gain from the extension of 
the core's political and commercial activity, e.g. the entrepreneurial classes and the inter-
mediaries of régional administration and commerce, whiist other will often loose, e.g. the 
traditional political élite and landed classes. Similarily in the core, some may loose out as a 
resuit of peripheral incorporation, e.g. manual and semi-skilled workers, whose competiti-
veness may be undercut by cheaper labour costs in the periphery. In addition, after inté-
gration, many in the periphery may expérience an absolute rise in their standard of living 
and welcome doser économie ties to the core, even though relative to the core's population 
they are still disadvantaged. Secondly, there are likely to be clear spatial différences 
between différent sub-regions of the periphery which confuse its catégorisation as either 
core or periphery. Thus whiist Eastern Québec remained underdeveloped, Montréal conti-
nued to be the financial center of Canada long after Ontario had emerged as the industrial 
center. Also a région may at the same time be both core and periphery depending upon 
which régions one is comparing. Whiist Québec exhibits many of Hechter's characteristic 
traits for a periphery in relation to Ontario, she is undoubtedly a core in her relations with 
the Atlantic Provinces and the West. Even if we limited the comparison to Ontario, the 
model is further weakened by the fact that Québec does have a provincial state govern-
ment which of late has done much to erode the cultural division of labour by political 
means, irrespective of core interests. Hence, historically, it must be concluded that Qué-
bec's décline owes more to her géographie location, her resource underdevelopment and 
the relative advance of other Canadian régions, rather than to the spécifie rôle which 
cultural factors played in determining économie opportunity and performance. We must 
perforée turn to other explanations for ethnie separatism, ones which, while not denying 
the importance of inter-regional inequalities, do not focuss on the régional level to the 
exclusion of analysing the rôle of key actors in the nationalist struggle, the ethnie intelli-
gentsia. 
THE ROLE OF THE ETHNIC INTELLIGENTSIA 
We may therefore accept a revised account of Hechter's cultural division of labour, 
without necessarily accepting its predicted relationship with the core-periphery model. 
However, it is possible, a priori, to assume that the grievances which arise from the occu-
pational discrimination which underlie the cultural division of labour, will be translated into 
a political movement designed to redress such grievances. This in no way détermines that 
the résultant movement will necessarily be a separatist one as Hechter seems to imply. It 
could be, and in fact was in Québec, a Social Crédit Party, or a reformist Libéral Party, 
neither of which challenged the legitimacy of the fédéral System, merely its opération when 
it seemed to threaten Québécois interests. Now although feelings of disadvantage are 
common within the French-Canadian population, only some translate thèse grievances 
into a préférence for the independence option. The différences between the gênerai elec-
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torate and the more committed P.Q. supporters appear to dérive from différent estimâtes 
of the chances of improvement coming with independence. This would appear to be the 
touchstone of the separatist case for a better life in a future sovereign Québec38. It is not 
that nationalist ideology is a new élément in the situation. Nationalism has long been a 
prominent feature of Québécois politics ever since the Patriotes movement of the 1820's 
and 1830's. But it has always been contained within a fédéral structure, within a broad 
philosophy of élite accommodation. What we hâve seen in Québec of late is a reformula-
tion of the basic principles of Québec self-determination; one in which a radical and refor-
ming ethnie technological and bureaucratie élite hâve played a leading rôle, both in the 
development of a separatist ideology and in the establishment of an effective and innova-
tive state apparatus which has become the prime instrument for séparation. 
From Confédération to the présent the pattern of ethnie accommodation between 
French and English in Québec developed within the context of rapid industrialisation. His-
torically, ethnie accommodation has been based on Québec's segmented character, with 
separate ethnie schools, religious organisations, means of communication, residential dif-
ferentiation and trade unions providing a self-perpetuating institutional séparation serving 
both linguistic communities. What disturbed this arrangement and fueled the separatist 
cause was modernisation and its attendant new actors the 'scientific bureaucrats'. In the 
immédiate post-war period, the growing discontent with federal-provincial relations, and 
the opposition to the policies and character of the Duplessis régime, as evidenced by the 
asbestos workers strike of 1949, hardened the split between the secularising intelligentsia 
and the défensive, clerico-nationalist ideology which had underpinned Church-State rela-
tions since Confédération days. The attack on Church dominated éducation, health and 
welfare services which the Quiet Révolution heralded was spearheaded by the expanded 
provincial bureaucracy created by Premier Paul Sauvé39. Hence forward, it was the pro-
vincial state apparatus which was to be used as the reforming instrument capable both of 
allowing Québec to 'catch up' with neighbouring Ontario as a modem society, and of 
providing employment, status and a future political rôle for the ambitious ethnie bureau-
crats within a network of Francophone public and parapublic institutions. "The aspirations 
of the new middle class and the growth and development of the institutions they staffed 
were to become the political priorities of the provincial state"40. Having replaced the 
Church as the main source of authority, the new bureaucratie élite now successfully chal-
lenged the leadership of the institutional élite by restricting the traditional management 
prérogatives of the authorities of such institutions as local school boards, hospital 
administrations. They espoused a politically centralised bureaucratie model of social mo-
dernisation which apart from curtailing the authority of French institutional managers, also 
transformed the Anglophone institutional managerial élite into a minority dépendent on 
the state and its dictâtes. The whole modernisation process pointed to the pivotai rôle of 
the state as the focus of reform, initiative and enterprise. State financed ventures such as 
Hydro-Québec, the Sidbec Steel complex and the pension and investment fund represen-
ted instruments for extending greater Québécois control over économie development also. 
But increasingly the leaders of the Lesage and successive governments recognised that 
Québec's drive toward autonomy would clash with fédéral priorities, especially as the fédé-
ral government was now playing a more aggressive rôle in such fields as régional 
development and cultural affairs, policies which did not always accord with Québec's inter-
ests41. 
Social mobilisation and state modernisation thus gave rise to a new nationalism in the 
sixties, which is now dominant within the Parti Québécois, and quite distinct from previous 
Québécois nationalism in several important respects. First, as we hâve seen, the new 
nationalism embraces the logic of social and économie modernisation as the key to a 
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dynamic and prosperous Québécois future. Second, whilst traditional nationalism has 
been conservative and engaged in the politics of cultural defence, the new nationalism 
was activist and interventionist, engaged in the politics of cultural promotion. Third, where 
the old nationalism was content to maintain the ethnie institutional séparation, even if this 
meant that Anglophones had the upper hand in certain sectors, the new nationalism now 
sought to penetrate ail sectors developing new forms of compétition with the English. 
Fourth, where the old nationalism had challenged the fédéral System only when it seemed 
to infrige on Québec's jurisdiction—the new nationalism called into question the basis of 
Confédération, challenging Ottawa's right to détermine revenue levels and resource 
allocation. Finally, the traditional nationalism's suspicion of the state as an instrument of 
governance, was displaced by an ideological commitment to state intervention and plan-
ning, such that it became the key actor in the struggle for ethnie survival and the spring-
board for group development42. 
We hâve argued that the ethnie bureaucratie élite played a décisive rôle in shaping 
Québec modernisation, but what of separatism and ethnie promotion43? To many out-
siders, language and cultural questions seem to hâve received a disproportionate amount 
of attention by former Québec governments and by the Parti Québécois. This is mainly 
because such observers fail to appreciate the pervasive rôle which language plays in 
almost ail aspects of contemporary public life, most notably in éducation, the workplace 
and in government44. Given the overriding concern to préserve the 'French fact in North 
America' it is not surprising that language, the essence of French distinctiveness, should 
be a primary political concern of the new nationalists. This concern is largely related to the 
fear that in time the language of the économie élite, with its associated technological spe-
cialisms, will come to dominate the language of the passive majority if the state does not 
intervene. In addition the trend of récent immigrants to assimilate into the Anglophone 
community has led to emotional assertions that in the absence of restrictive language 
policies only a tiny proportion of immigrants would opt for the French language instruction 
offered by éducation boards. Démographie forecasts of continuing déclines in the fertility 
levels of Francophones underpin the minority consciousness, which Camille Laurin reflects 
in his characterisation of the Québécois as an "endangered species" as a resuit of thèse 
three trends. 
One explanation for the central rôle language priorities play within Québécois politics 
today relates to the growth of the state sector. The new middie class is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the public and parapublic sector as a resuit of the intensive institution 
building of the sixties when the municipal civil service, health and éducation Systems re-
quired and absorbed Francophone social scientists, engineers and business graduâtes. 
Also to integrate into the public sector, one did not hâve to be a fluent bilingual, a require-
ment of the corporate, private sector. Once the state sector began to be adequately man-
ned, language became a political issue as the aspiring middie classes, blocked in their 
attempts to swell the state bureaucracy, looked to the Anglophone dominated private 
sector for employment. Disadvantaged linguistically and experiencing blocked mobility and 
ethnie discrimination both in the fédéral government bureaucracy and in the private sector, 
the thwarted intelligentsia reinforced its détermination to seek in separatism a collective, 
and then political solution to its dilemma. Only in a separate, independent nation-state 
could the full aspirations of the Francophones be realised. Maître chez nous' was to be-
come a fact as well as a promise. 
In the event, when a nationalist government became elected on November 15, 1976 
the Parti Québécois instituted many reforms and programmes which heralded the création 
of a national state culture based on the language of the majority—French. The ideals of 
the ethnie bureaucrats and académies, technologists and businessmen who constitute the 
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government of Québec hâve been crystallised into the concept of sovereignty-association. 
Association with Canada is dépendent upon Québec achieving her sovereignty, and this in 
turn is to be determined by a référendum. But as British expérience has recently demons-
trated referenda are fraught with ambiguity and invariably provide 'results' which please no 
particular section and antagonise most because of their indecisiveness. 
Thus the issue of Sovereignty-Association, the détails of which are available in 
government proposais, must surely be dépendent upon the direction and strength of the 
separatist vote in the forthcoming référendum45. At root the issue revolves around the best 
way of measuring the démocratie will of the people of Québec, accepting of course, that the 
référendum is but one mechanism by which that will may be expressed. In due time it is 
likely that other political methods may be necessary to résolve the Canada-Québec im-
passe. 
SEPARATISM AND DEMOCRACY 
We retum in this final section to some of the contradictions inhérent in the ethnie 
separatist case. Many of the issues raised, albeit briefly, are fundamental to the Political 
Geography of state formation and deserving of more attention. The separatist case is 
based on the premise that ethnie majorities within a multi-ethnic policy hâve the right to 
constitute national govemments in their own sovereign states—the daim of national self-
determination. Initially such daims appear to be framed in majoritarian terms and hence 
inherently démocratie. But on doser examination we find that there is much ambiguity in 
the justification for majoritarian independence. The Parti Québécois pins its hopes on a 
référendum mandate for the sovereignty-association option. The récent dévolution refe-
renda in Britain should alert us to the critical question of how large a majority would be 
necessary in the référendum to justify the sovereignty-association proposais. In the United 
Kingdom a clear majority of Scots voters approved the dévolution measure. However, this 
was declared invalid as they did not represent the minimum required proportion of the total 
potential electorate (at 40%). Some might argue that given the importance of the issue in 
Québec, a minimum of 50% to 55% vote in favor would be too close. From the per-
spective of the P.Q. leadership, however, a 55% vote would mean acceptance by a "huge 
majority" of Francophones—somewhere around 65%46. The implication is that a genuine 
victory of the majority of Francophones would be assured. Note that in this interprétation, 
the majority is defined, not in terms of a collection of individuals, but by cultural groupings. 
"What this implies is not that the numerical majority ought to ruie, but that the majority of 
the majority culture, should ruie; which is as much as to daim a right to ruie on behalf of a 
certain group within society, not simply by virtue of its being the majority, but by virtue of 
its cultural characteristics, or its substantive way of life"47. 
Although it is framed as an exercise in democracy, the forthcoming référendum has 
been critieized on the grounds that only citizens résident in Québec are eligible to vote. 
Opponents argue, as they did in the U.K., that if it is such a major constitutional proposai, 
then surely the voice of the country as a whole should be heard and not just those in the 
part which is culturally différent. Separatism has implications far beyond the borders of 
Québec. The retort, of course, is that the basis of the separatist daim is a cultural one, in 
the only political unit in which the French are a majority. The rest of Canada is hardly likely 
to vote for its own dismemberment! Further it is argued that it is the spécial responsibility 
of the Québec state to represent the interests, not simply of individuals per se, but of the 
French culture; the corollary of this is that it is the French nation which has the right to 
separate if it so chooses. Now this is a right which is claimed, irrespective of majoritarian 
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status, for if we change the scale of the context and look at Canada as a whole, the culture 
which is said to hâve the right is clearly a minority one. It is the political context which 
détermines majority-minority rights, a separate issue altogether from the collective daims 
to independence as a right per se. The emphasis on the appropriate political context pro-
vides further illustration of the tensions inhérent in the separatist idéal. In the past the P.Q. 
leadership, Camille Laurin in particular, hâve pressed the daim of the Francophone nation 
to independence because it is the only nation in Québec (implying that only territorially 
defined majorities hâve rights to constitute nations); other ethnie groups hâve a responsi-
bility to participate and cooperate to develop the national culture of Québec48. However, 
the Minister also uses the term nation in a way which is synonymous with the state, and 
not the ethnie. Separatist rhetoric refers to Québec as a nation struggling for political 
independence. In order to do so this argument must maintain that the Québec state repre-
sents not only the embodiment of the French nation (as used to be argued), but of ail the 
people within it. In other words, the "national culture" of Québec, though decidedly French, 
is the common property of ail its citizens. The extension of this nationalist doctrine is that 
the state, primarily responsible for the promotion of national culture, has the responsibility 
to ensure that every citizen learn the single officiai language. Thus the preamble of the 
original version of the Language Charter declared that "the French language has always 
been the language of the Québec people, that it is, indeed, the very instrument by which 
they hâve articulated their identity"49. To maintain this identity throughout the province the 
language was to be used as an instrument of French cultural promotion. Québec's non-
francophone population saw in this formulation the establishment of an officiai state cul-
ture, with the implication that they would become disadvantaged citizens even within their 
own province. Recognising this fear and in the light of substantial criticism of its earlier 
drafts, the preamble to the new bill (Bill 101) was modified, referring to French as "the 
distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking the instrument 
by which that people has articulated its identity". Yet as Knopff maintains this awkward 
reformulation does not remove the inhérent ambiguity which gave rise to the légal enfor-
cement of French culture in Québec, that is "that the nationalist position, when pushed to 
its logical extremity, leads to difficulties which force the nationalists to embrace a majorita-
rianism which itself entails an abandonment of the fundamental premise of nationalism, 
namely that nations and states should be coextensive". 
The dilemma facing the Parti Québécois is that the rationale for the separatist drive is 
'ethnie nationalism'. But rather than re-draw Québec's boundaries to coincide with the 
Francophone nation (to possibly incorporate irredentist minorities in Madawaska, Acadia, 
North-Eastern Ontario and parts of the U.S.A.) the Parti Québécois prefers to avoid the 
dilemma by referring to the Québécois nation's right to self-government, thereby conver-
ting an ethnie nationalism to a territorial nationalism. It hopes to persuade non-franco-
phones that its conception of nationalism is territorial and state-based, one in which they 
make partake if they choose to exercise their right to assimilate into the dominant national 
culture'. Indeed participation will be encouraged, as the Parti Québécois is anxious to 
portray its government as a government for ail in the province regardless of ethnie origin. 
Now this tension between 'ethnie' and 'territorial' nationalism is a common characte-
ristic of separatist movements. The Biafran secessionist attempt failed in large part to 
convince the non-lbo minority groups within Biafra that Ibo ethnie nationalism was but the 
spearhead of a larger Eastern Région territorial nationalism. Similarly the failure of Plaid 
Cymru to significantly extend its électoral base out from the Welsh-speaking western 
heartland is due in the main to their failure to convince the 70% non-Welsh-speakers that 
their nationalism is at least as territorially motivated as it is culturally motivated!i0. If the 
Parti Québécois can arrive at a programme of action which can reconcile both ethnie and 
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territorial-state nationalism, then the separatist option of Sovereignty-Association will be 
both more démocratie and more likely to provide a surer foundation for an independent 
Québec. For, recall that nations are formed and not given. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we hâve argued that the uneven spatial impact of modernisation, cou-
pied with the cultural division of labour are important structural components of the 
development of ethnie relations in Québec. However, the rôle of the thwarted ethnie intelli-
gentsia was considered to be crucial in explaining the timing and the political character of 
the résultant separatist movement which culminated in the government of the Parti Qué-
bécois. It remains to be seen to what extent the idéal of independence, cherished by a 
section of the Québécois élite, will be endorsed by the gênerai population of this most 
distinctive of Canadian provinces. 
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